



Collaborating Across Philosophical Worldviews

Sean P. Wright, MA, MS, LMHC
Lutheran Community Services Northwest
swright@lcsnw.org



Disclosures:

Relevant Financial Relationships:




- Employed at Lutheran Community Services NW
- Consultant for Washington State CBT+ Collaborative

Relevant Nonfinancial Relationships

- none
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CBS values collaboration

- Reticulated model of science
- Recent collaborations exist among basic researchers, model developers, economists, evolutionary biologists, and others






Collaboration may reach beyond psychology

- Lots of people outside of the CBS community (and psychology more broadly construed) are interested in the CBS goal of “creating a science more adequate to the challenge of the human condition” (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes & Wilson, 2012)
 - Additionally, many people have interest in the human condition but do not share a commitment to specific scientific goals
 - Challenge: many fields of interest do not support practitioners in being *explicit* about the philosophical worldview that gives rise to intellectual commitments
 - Proposed solution: direct interaction first to generate mutual interest and then exploring implications of worldviews when actively working together on problems (an extension of Hayes, 1998).
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Shared interest in problems drives collaborations

You sit there and say: why isn't everybody doing S-matrix; another guy says: why isn't anybody doing field theory? The real problem is: *why is nobody solving anything?*" –Richard Feynman, 1961

- Collaborators may initially orient to shared interest in particular problems and be less interested in resolving philosophical conflicts
 - “Most theorists have not spent their days...in some philosophers dreamworld, weighing one cluster of disembodied concepts against another, picking and choosing among so many theories or paradigms Rather, their main task has been to *calculate...*” (Kaiser, 2005)
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Example: Mutual interest in the F-C framework

- Barnes-Holmes & Hussey (2016): “a specific threshold of interest must be reached before it impacts in some meaningful way on the scientific activities of that researcher (e.g., adopting a new methodology that was created by the other tradition)”

54 BARNES-HOLMES AND HUSSEY




Figure 1. The suggested relationships among behavioural observations, behavioural effects and theory within the functional-cognitive meta-theoretical framework. The diagram highlights that behavioural observations are separate from functionally defined principles and operational definitions, with explanatory paths diverging early in the analytic process. The diagram also indicates that mutual interest is likely but not guaranteed at the level of effects or theory. An alternative functional-cognitive theoretical approach (i.e., a “third way”) is represented by the dashed arrows.



Guidelines for effective collaboration

- Maxim 1: A worldview is determined by its root metaphor
- Maxim 2: Each worldview is autonomous
- Maxim 3: Maxim 3: Eclecticism is confusing
 - Worldviews can be blended locally as “strategic integrations” (Hayes, Hayes, & Reese, 1988) while still maintaining consistent global worldview (intellectual commitment to theory’s scope)
- Maxim 4: Concepts which have lost contact their root metaphors are empty abstractions


“[People] forget where in fact these [categories] come from, and assume that these have some intrinsic and ultimate cosmic value in themselves”

-Pepper (1942). *World Hypotheses: A Study in Evidence*





Guidelines derived from the autonomous nature of worldviews

- **Corollary 2a:** Not OK to disparage one (adequate) worldview in terms of the categories of another (apples are not failed oranges)
 - **Corollary 2b:** Finding flaws in one worldview does not strengthen the claims of another world
 - **Corollary 2c:** A worldview does not have to accept data *at face value* (aka *the data are per the worldview, not as they say they are*)
 - **Corollary 2d:** A worldview does not need to account for commonsense and doubt *at face value*
 - **Corollary 2e:** Commonsense (or familiar) examples are useful to explore the differences in worldviews
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Own and state pre-analytic goals

Goals are pre-analytic they “cannot ultimately be evaluated or justified, only stated.”

Suggestions for selecting pre-analytic goals for a contextual philosophy of science:


- 1. Avoid implicit goals.
- 2. Avoid vague goals or goals that cannot be assessed.
- 3. Avoid incompatible goals.
- 4. Avoid using solely short-term goals.
- 5. Avoid extremely long-term goals, without medium and short-term goals.
- 6. Avoid rapidly changing goals.
- 7. Compare performance to goals.
- 8. Compare different courses of action and modify your behavior accordingly.

-Hayes (1993)




Example: The problem of Cognitive Bias

Mechanistic Worldview



Contextual Worldview



The Behavior Analyst 2009, 32, 29–49 No. 1 (Spring)
 A Behavior-Analytic Account of Cognitive Bias in
 Clinical Populations
 Alisha M. Wray, Rachel A. Freund, and Michael J. Dougher
 University of New Mexico

“The difference between functional contextualism and the received view of science is that for most science, bias is a nuisance variable. For the contextualist, it is foundational inasmuch as meeting the specific goals of analysis is foundational to truth.”

(Dymond & Roche, 2013, p. 39)



Accounting for cognitive bias


Phenomena of Mutual Interest

Performance on behavioral tasks
Impact of environmental stimuli on
biased/unbiased performance


Mechanistic (Cognitive)

- Dual process Theories: System 1 / System 2, Fuzzy-Trace Theory
- Evolutionary adaptations

Functional Contextual

- RFT: Training history required to support responding in ways inconsistent/consistent with formal probability theory
 - Coherence as a reinforcer
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The effect of collaboration



Chapter 1: Marian and Wright, 2017

Chapter 2: Aravena-Jokelainen & Wright, 2017

Chapter 3: Cole, Ortolani, & Wright, *in press*

What are the contextual strands of effective collaboration?

Must specify the pragmatic goal: in this case, publishing something novel about a well-known phenomenon

Strands = verbal label for a particular working that contributes to the quality of the act-in-context

Legal scholars

- Sharing the workload
- Acquiring new knowledge
- Advancing a career
- Offering an opportunity to someone

Contextualist (me)

- Introducing new people to CBS
- Sharing knowledge/skills that I don't get to use everyday
- Influencing a separate field




Embracing the challenge of collaboration

- **Collaboration may feel uncomfortable**
- **Cultivating Psychological flexibility and nurturing interpersonal contexts may be helpful**
 - **Defusion/acceptance**

“In Danny’s company Amos, too, became a different person: uncritical. Or, at least, uncritical of whatever came from Danny. He didn’t even poke fun in jest. He enabled Danny to feel, in a way he hadn’t before, confident.”

-*The Undoing Project*, biography of the founders of cognitive bias research, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman





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